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TRANSLATION: WHO NEEDS IT?
Sanford Levinson*

I. ANALOGIES

I

begin with some remarks about analogy, for in some ways the debate over the meaning of constitutional fidelity boils down to what,
among several contenders, one finds the best analogy to (and thus a
good means of insight for understanding) the ordinary enterprise of
constitutional interpretation. Consider several of the leading contenders. Ronald Dworkin has famously analogized the practice of constitutional interpretation to writing a "chain novel," as the author of
chapter one hands on her work to the person who will write the next
chapter (who will then similarly give the first two chapters to yet a
third person, and so on).' As a participant in this Symposium, Dworkin strongly supported the analogy pressed by Lawrence Lessig of
constitutional interpretation as "translation." Finally, I note the suggestion by Jack Balkin and myself that those persons engaging in operationally important acts of constitutional interpretation (which may
immediately eliminate most academic interpreters), can be described
as "performing artists" and, therefore, can usefully be compared to a
musical performer playing a Schubert sonata or a piece of "classic"
jazz, or to a stage director
who has the responsibility for putting on a
2
production of a play.
One might, then, imagine being asked to take a multiple choice test
and facing a question as to which of these three is the best analogy to
constitutional interpretation, though one should probably recognize
the possibility, as Mark Tbshnet has suggested, that the correct answer
is none of the above. Even if that is the case, though, I think it remains true that much contemporary discussion about constitutional
interpretation draws, like much legal discussion more generally, on
analogical reasoning. One might ask Tushnet, therefore, whether the
problem lies in these particular analogies rather than in the fact that
one is offering an analogy at all.
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,

University of Texas Law School. What follows is a somewhat awkward amalgam of
spontaneous remarks and prepared text responding to Lawrence Lessig's Fidelity and
Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997). As is usual in symposia, Lessig was able
to present only relatively brief parts of his extremely interesting paper, and I chose
myself to focus also on very selective aspects of the paper (and comments). No one,
therefore, should confuse what follows with a full response to Lessig's very broadranging arguments. I am extremely grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for

offering me the opportunity to participate in such an interesting event.
1. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-38 (1986).
2. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other PerformingArts,
139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597 (1991).
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On the assumption, then, that analogical reasoning is pervasive, I
want to ask how analogies work in everyday life, as a preface to pointing out something that I think is peculiar about the specific analogies
(and analogists) mentioned above. Return for a moment to your
teenage years, when new things are happening, new experiences are
being assimilated. Imagine that you are curious about what it means
truly to be in love, or to experience fighting in a war. I assume for the
moment that you have actually experienced neither of these, but you
are talking to someone who has. How might that person respond to
you? Well, one possibility is that your interlocutor would adopt the
method of analogy. She might ask you to think about the kinds of
feelings you have about Fido and then add that being in love is at least
ten times more intense then that. As to fighting in a war, especially if
it is two males talking to one another, the person with experience
might ask you to recall how you felt when playing football against the
team of bruisers from across town, when you were just run over every
play by somebody bigger and more dextrous than you; the analogist
might well add, once again, that being in a war is at least a hundred
times scarier than that because people are trying to kill you and not
simply block you out.
Let us look at one structural feature of these analogies. The person
asking the question, by stipulation, hasn't experienced the phenomenon X about which information is being sought, whether it is being in
love or fighting in Vietnam. The person offering the analogy, who has,
presumably, experienced X, attempts to convey to the questioner the
phenomenological nature of X by making an appeal to what the questioner has experienced in his or her own life, such as devotion to a dog
or being in a highly competitive-and not a little dangerous-sports
event. As the stock wisdom of political organizers would have it, you
begin your conversations with people by addressing them in the terms
with which they are already familiar, indeed comfortable, before introducing a brand new vocabulary or analytical structure.
Now, note a peculiarity in the analogies of Dworkin, Lessig, or
Balkin and myself, at least if they are supposed to help an inexperienced (or, at least, confused) person understand what it means to engage in faithful constitutional interpretation. The peculiarity is this:
neither those offering the analogies nor the audience to whom they
are offered has in fact engaged in the experience that the analogy is
based on. Thus Ronald Dworkin, for all of his truly remarkable accomplishments, has not, to my knowledge, ever tried to write a chain
novel, nor, I am quite sure, has anyone within the legal community to
whom the chain-novel analogy is offered. Balkin and I have never
actually tried to mount a production of an opera or a play or offered a
public performance of Take the A Train, nor, I strongly suspect, have
more than a fraction of the audience to whom we offer such analogies
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as a way of understanding legal interpretation.3 Finally, even though
Larry Lessig has in fact on occasion translated Dante into English (as
I learned at the Fordham Symposium when I had casually assumed
that he had not), he has not, so far as I know, offered his translations
to the public at large. Once again, it is almost certainly the case that
few in Lessig's audience have ever defined themselves as professional
translators.
Isn't there something peculiar about a conversation in which you
ask someone, "What is it like to do X," and the answer offered is that
doing X is like doing something you haven't done? How is that supposed to help you? It is like telling someone who asks what it is like
to design a mousetrap that "it is, you know, like designing a rocket to
send people to the moon." But, of course, I do not know what it is
like to design a rocket to send people to the moon. The only analogy
that evokes, for me at least, is to something of almost impossible difficulty. Crafting a rocket to land on the moon is a great analogy for
that, because I have no idea how they did it; for me it was just a miracle. But if you offered it to me (at least) as an analogy for something
reasonably concrete, I would be mystified. Why didn't you speak to
me of something I did know something about rather than asking me to
compare to something I am having trouble with-what is it like to
design a mousetrap, or what is it like to faithfully interpret the Equal
Protection Clause-to something I have never experienced (and, what
is worse, that you yourself may never have experienced)?
These questions can be raised, of course, about any and all analogies. But I want now to focus on the particular analogy, translation,
about which our principal paper-giver, Lawrence Lessig, has written a
number of extremely interesting articles from which I have learned
much.4 Still, I have questions about whether the emphasis on translation in Lessig's work can bear the weight he places on it.
I begin by asking a very simple question: who needs translations?
Surely "native speakers" do not. I would not, after all, except in the
most metaphorical of senses, ever wander into a book store and ask
for an English-language translation of Shakespeare or Milton. We
might, of course, ask what is the best edition of Shakespeare or
Milton, and one of the criteria might well be the extent to which a
specific edition defines (and in some sense surely "translates") words
3. In fact, Balkin and I organized a session at the 1996 meeting of the law and
interpretation section of the Association of American Law Schools, on law and music,
and a number of persons who spoke in the discussion afterward spoke of their own
experiences as musicians, which included, in at least one instance, experience as a
professional opera singer prior to entering the legal academy.
4. See Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to
Imperfection, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 839 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Responses]; Lawrence
Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125; Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L Rev.
395 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 Tex. L Rev. 1165 (1993).
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likely to be unfamiliar to the modem reader (such as "fardel") or,
perhaps as much to the point, words that continue in the present vernacular but whose meanings have shifted profoundly over time (such
as "sentimental"). Perhaps this example underscores the point that
there is a strong connection between "translation" and that constitutional theory known as "originalism" inasmuch as both are based on
the notion of a primordial text whose meaning has grown elusive because of the passage of time.
One does not, of course, have to be a "native speaker" to know a
language (and thus have little or no use for translations). I happen to
know that Bruce Ackerman, one of the other principal speakers at
this conference, is an accomplished reader of German. I presume,
therefore, that if he wants to read a work by Goethe or Habermas, he
can walk into any bookstore in Berlin or Frankfurt, purchase a German-language copy, and begin reading it at a local coffeehouse. Alas,
that option is unavailable to me; I am an all-too-typical American who
is literate in one and only one language. What this means, therefore,
is that if I want to read Dante or Goethe-or anybody else who writes
in any language other than English-I need a translation because the
original work was written in a foreign language that I almost literally
can make no sense of. If the original language is, say, Chinese or Armenian, I can drop the "almost," for there is no way that I can supply
the slightest meaning to the completely undecipherable (for me)
squiggles of ink on the page. But there are, of course, people who can
supply meaning to such otherwise mysterious collections of ink: they
are the persons whose services have been purchased to provide readers like me with a translation.
So now I ask the following question: given that we are in fact native
speakers of English, and even, at least within this audience, adept in
the particular language of American law talk, how can we be helped
to understand the perplexities that even we feel, when engaging in
constitutional interpretation, by reference to the perplexities we feel
when confronting a book written in a language that we do not understand at all?
I might be dwelling too much on this point, but still all of these
"translation" metaphors have, if you will, gravitational weight that
ought to be recognized (and analyzed). And, as I've been suggesting,
one of the curiosities about the translation metaphor is its implication
that we as acknowledged experts in lawtalk need translators. But
maybe I am missing the point. After all, one might suggest not that
we need translators, but, rather, that we serve as translators for others
who are not conversant in lawtalk. Here the notion is we are the experts and there are people out there who just don't know what lawtalk
means. When Lessig, then, talks about translation, it might be in this
sense. We are, to our audience of non-legally trained naifs, exactly in
the same position as, say, a translator of The Tibetan Book of the
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Dead is to us. This being said, I do not have the impression that Lessig is truly referring (only) such naifs as the consumers of translations.
II.

TRANSLATIONS

I want to use the remainder of my response to look at some of the
questions raised by Lessig's invocation of the translation analogy. The
point, of course, is to determine how truly helpful that analogy is.
Lessig's extremely important enterprise is to address the ways that
we explain and/or justify-these may or may not be the same enterprise for the constitutional theorist-the changes that undoubtedly
have occurred within the American constitutional order. To what extent can any-let alone all-such changes be viewed as "faithful" to
the Constitution in whose name interpreters claim to speak and by
which they gain their political authority? A theory of fidelity, Lessig
argues, must answer two demands. First, it must show how interpretive change is consistent with interpretive constancy; second it must5
show how interpretive change is not just the judges making it up.
Quite obviously, the task is not to show that some "change is consistent with interpretive constancy." As a practical matter, almost no
one can be heard to argue the opposite. Rather, the debate is almost
always triggered by particularchanges and the charges by their outraged opponents that they are not in fact legitimized by the Constitution. Should these changes be the result of judicial interpretations of
the Constitution, as is the case, for example, with Roe v. Wade,6 then
the opponents are quick to charge "judicial usurpation," which is just
another way of saying that, in some fundamental sense, the judges just
made it up.
This does not mean that judges behave whimsically. Rather, the
usual charge would be that the judges in question are highly committed to political agendas and that they simply do whatever it takes to
present, however implausibly, their favorite political visions as being
required by the Constitution itself. Lessig may believe that such
judges and implausible opinions exist, though he has not, so far as I
know, devoted many pages to those suggested changes that he finds
unacceptable. His primary purpose has in fact been to defend-some
might even say offer apologetics for-many of the important changes
that have occurred in our constitutional fabric. And, in defending
these changes as skillful translations of the Constitution, Lessig is determined to overcome the image of the judge as someone who "simply
beats the text into a shape which will serve his own purpose."7
5. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 Fordham L Rev. 1365, 136566 (1997).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism 151 (1982).

1462

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

This debate has been going on for quite a while now, under the
rubric of constitutional interpretation or constitutional hermeneutics.
Lessig's most self-conscious contribution to this debate, as indicated,
is precisely the analogy of translation as at least a complement, and
possibly even a substitute, for these other terms. But I presume it is
already obvious that I have my doubts about the ultimate helpfulness
of the analogy.
All of us are consumers within an intellectual marketplace,
swamped with offers for new tools that will ostensibly make our lives
easier and, one hopes, better. Often, though, purchase of these tools
requires learning new languages, as can be attested to by anyone who
has ever tried to read the directions for installing a VCR. There is, as
Milton Friedman tirelessly points out, no such thing as free lunch; the
purchase even of helpful tools may require significant startup costs as
we learn how to use them. Over the past decades, all of us have made
our own decisions as to how much to invest in such tools as economics, structuralist anthropology, moral philosophy, history, and the like
in our efforts to make sense of the Constitution. So now Lessig asks
us to think deeply about translation as a way of understanding (and
resolving?) some basic constitutional issues. The practical question
for many of us is whether we now need to take the time and devote
our ever-more-scarce energies to becoming conversant with various
issues that arise within the community of professional translators.
It is possible that I have misunderstood Lessig. Perhaps he does not
ask us to think very deeply about issues surrounding the notion of
translation. In that case, then, "translation" would be simply a heuristic, but otherwise containing no great significance as an understanding
of law. It might be similar, say, to the earlier mentioned suggestion
offered by Jack Balkin and myself that one might profitably ask
whether the Constitution is more like a classical symphony or a jazz
standard. The latter, for example, features opportunities-indeed,
many would say, demands improvisation-in a way that the former is
thought not to. I think I speak for Jack as well in saying that I rather
like our question and believe that it grasps something about the role
of the constitutional interpreter. Yet we scarcely offer the jazz artist,
trying to make a particular performance of Take the A Train "the best
that it can be," as the one best way to understand the Herculean
judge. We do argue that it is a way, worth, say, several hours of reflection even if not an entire course. So what, precisely, does Lessig think
he is selling us in offering "translation" as a new tool in our intellectual kit? Should we buy it?
By happy accident, The Times Literary Supplement (the "TLS")
only recently devoted part of an issue to reflections on "the translator's art."' A perusal of the interesting reviews and essays it con8. See The Times Literary Supplement, Sept. 6, 1996, at 3-14.
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tained reveals the minefield of problems attached to the translation
analogy that Lessig has made his own. At the highest level of theory,
one is faced with basic ontological questions involving the relationship
of the translated text to the translation. Consider "the special case of
Samuel Becket," who translated his own works, first written in French
or English, into the other language.9 According to one writer, though,
"Beckett never was strictly a translator of himself.' 0 Each shift in language produced not a literary or linguistic equivalent but a new work.
There simply are no equivalents between Beckett's French and English texts."" The reviewer, George Craig, laconically goes on to write,
"Ah, I see: there never was a problem [of deciding whether a translation was adequate to the occasion]: we just happen to have two texts
called by the same or similar names."' ' This would lead to the conclu13
sion that "there is no English translation of En Attendant Godot,"'
but, rather, a brand new play called Waiting for Godot. This latter
play could, perhaps, be compared in certain ways to the earlier-written play-which is more inventive in its use of language, which seems
to offer a more or less bleak view of the human condition, etc.-but
not praised or criticized as a translation of the former. "Perhaps it is
not translation," Craig is willing to concede, "but neither is it the invention of something utterly other."14 One is tempted to offer the
same comment in regard to Lessig's argument, though it should be
obvious that this would forestall little argument, especially as to how,
if at all, we could tell when the (non)-translation indeed spills over
into the presumptively forbidden "invention of something utterly
other." Constitutional theory cognescenti will recognize this as one of
the issues underlying the existence of non-Article V amendments
within the American constitutional system, about which both Lessig
and I have written elsewhere.' 5
Or consider another TLS review, this one by Clive Wilmer of Robert Pinsky's new translation of Dante's Inferno.16 One's attention
might be caught by Wilmer's contrast of the warm embrace of Dante
into English culture with the decidedly more chilly reception accorded
17 One is
"Goethe, Racine or Pushkin, the notorious untranslatables."'
immediately interested in what kinds of texts can be successfully
translated. How important is it that Wilmer is writing of poets? An9. George Craig, By Whose Hand? The Special Case of Samuel Beckett, The
Times Literary Supplement, Sept. 6, 1996, at 4.
10. Whatever it might mean to be "strictly a translator."
11. Craig, supra note 9, at 4.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. See Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional
Amendment (Sanford Levinson, ed., 1995); Lessig, Responses, supra note 4.
16. See Clive Wilmer, Dante Made Plain, The Times Literary Supplement, Sept. 6,
1996, at 3.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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other reviewer, writing about recent work in the theory of translation,
reminds us of Robert Frost's famous comment that poetry is precisely
what gets lost in translation.' 8 Maybe "untranslatability" as an attribute of (certain) language is limited to poetry, especially if we view
poetry as constituted in part by pure relationships of sounds rather
than, say, by its propositional semantics. To the extent that we can
quickly distinguish poetry from law, then we, as lawyers, would presumably not have to worry about translational "impossibilities" in relation to our more mundane world.
Still, just as bumblebees fly in spite of their apparently contradicting
certain laws of physics, there are English translations even of Goethe,
Racine, and Pushkin, 19 in part, because as yet another reviewer wrote,
"there can be no civilization without translations."20 But, of course,
the presence of (what are agreed, ontologically, to be) translations
usually serves to generate vigorous disputes, often quite acerbic, about
their adequacy. Terry Hale, reviewing The Translator'sInvisibility: A
History of Translation,begins his review by noting that "[t]ranslations
can be natural, crisp, vivid, idiomatic, stylish, flowing. They can also
be wooden, doughy, dull, unidiomatic, hurried, disconcerting." '21 Presumably we all want the former. But how, if at all, can we assure that
happy result?
One answer is to commission translations only from persons with
the proper credentials, whatever we think those might be. Among
other things we must believe, for this strategy to be successful, is that
the best translations are produced by the best-trained professionals,
while, concomitantly, inadequate translations are produced by those
readily recognized as incompetents. Alas, this does not seem to be the
case. Thus Wilmer, after considering a host of translations of Dante,
pronounces the latest, by the widely-praised poet Robert Pinsky, a
disappointment. "The diction is numbly literary," says Wilmer, "and
there seems little control of nuance or association. '"22 He offers Pinsky the cold comfort that there exist "many versions far worse than
his."' 23 I suppose this is like telling a judge that his or her opinion,
18. See Susan Bassnett, Nothing Lost, Nothing Sacred,The Tunes Literary Supple-

ment, Sept. 6, 1996, at 9.
19. See Douglas Hofstadter, What's Gainedin Translation,N.Y. Times (Book Re-

view), Dec. 8, 1996, at 47-48 (considering the merits of four translations of Pushkin's
poem "Eugene Onegin"). Apropos of the central theme of my own essay, not the
least interesting feature of Hofstadter's own essay is the fact that, although he "once
studied [Russian] for a short while... I've never held a conversation or read a book
in Russian." Id. at 47. That does not stop him, however, from offering his views as to
the merits of the four translations he discusses.

20. Lachlan Mackinnon, A Last Testament, The Times Literary Supplement, Sept.
6, 1996, at 6.
21. Terry Hale, When the Originalis Unfaithful, The Tunes Literary Supplement,
Sept. 6, 1996, at 8.
22. Wilmer, supra note 16, at 4.
23. Id.
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however egregious, is at least not so bad as, say, Scott v. Sandford. 4
Even if true, this is unlikely to be perceived as praise.
The TLS symposium is itself ample evidence of the fact that there
are always a multiplicity of translators offering their wares for our
purchase, and most of us are left quite in the dark as to which version
should grace our bookshelves. One answer is simply to accept the
verdict of the reviewers themselves. Wilmer tells his readers, for example, that "[t]he translation [of Dante] I now reach for most readily
... is Laurence Binyon's."' 5 So should we rush out to buy Binyon
with confidence that we will be able to appreciate "its most pleasing
quality, its relatively effortless use of rhyme"?' Perhaps, though what
do we do when we read yet other reviews that may even praise Pinskyz' or, at least, give kudos to translators other than Binyon? It presumably makes no more sense to rely without further questioning on
those the TLS picks to review the latest books than, for example, to
rely on those who happen to be on the Supreme Court for definitive
interpretation of the Constitution. Nor, in seeking assessment of the
Court's own work product (how good were they in interpreting the
Constitution?) would we necessarily rely on those whose articles happen to be selected by The Supreme Court Review or even on those
august twenty-four year old editors of the Harvard Law Review who
offer each November their own evaluations of the previous year's
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court? So what does one
do, when faced with disagreement among trained professionals as to
the merits of any particular translation or interpretation? One might,
of course, simply read a number of translations and then announce
which among them one likes best, but if the "one" doing the reading
and announcing is in fact not fluent in both languages, then it is not at
all clear what authority any such pronouncement may have.'
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. Wilmer, supra note 16, at 3.
26. Id
27. See John Ahern, Vulgar Eloquence, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Jan. 1, 1995, at 3.

Ahern, the Dante Antolini Professor of Italian Letters at Vassar, praises Pinsky's
"splendid translation," with "sinewy lines whose edges you can actually hear. This is
true verse." Id

28. I in fact purchased the Pinsky volume and, at long last, read the Inferno, which
I had started at least twice before (in other translations) and never been able to finish.
Still, as noted in the text, what do I know about the merits of any particular translation? The fact that I liked Pinsky is scarcely evidence of the superiority of his translation. Similarly, we would scarcely assign much weight to the announcement of
someone who is ignorant of the modalities of constitutional interpretation, see Philip
Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991), that he greatly likes a given judicial
opinion, so long, at least, as we adhere to notions of professional expertise in either
translation or constitutional interpretation.

Hofstadter, in discussing the merits of Pushkin translations in spite of his own lack
of training in Russian, notes the importance of multiple translations:
There was great magic in the act of jumping back and forth between two
translations of each sonnet. Had there been just one, I would simply have
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But this final point simply forces us to return to the central peculiarity of the translation analogy: although everyone at the Fordham
Symposium and those who are now reading this Response do indeed
need "translations" to read at least some great literature-I presume
that we would all be dazzled if anyone announced his or her ability to
read Goethe, Racine, Pushkin, Dante, Isaiah, Kierkegaard, and Sophocles in their original, to name only authors within the Western tradition-all of us can read all of the Supreme Court's decisions for
ourselves, especially insofar as they are "merely" interpreting the
Constitution rather than, say, tackling the more mysterious aspects of
the Internal Revenue or Bankruptcy codes.
We may be, of course, attractively modest in our claims to
omnicompetence regarding law talk; after all, I assume that most of us
run across English words that we do not know, requiring the use of a
dictionary before going on. Such uncertainties might well arise in regard to letters of marque and reprisal,2 9 the Capitation clause, 30 or
even bills of attainder.3 ' It is still not clear to me, though, that it helps
more to say that we want to "translate" these clauses rather than, simply, to "interpret" or "understand" them. If, as Ronald Dworkin sughad to take the translator's word that this is more or less what Pushkin
wrote, having no idea how many liberties had actually been taken. But with
two translations side by side [and ultimately four], each had the effect of
keeping the other honest. If they deviated from each other in any significant
way, it was obvious that somebody had changed something, though it was
not clear who or what. Interestingly, this happened very seldom .... Indeed, the two English texts taken together gave a powerful impression of
what the underlying Russian had to be like. I compare this to the nautical
notion of triangulation, in which having two different landmarks to sight on a
coast allows you to pinpoint just where at sea you are, whereas having just
one is too little information .... It was.. . just this type of slow and systematic line-by-line triangulation that gradually gave me the chutzpa [to assess
the triangulations in spite of not knowing the Russian language itself].
Hofstadter, supra note 19, at 48.
The importance of a "market" in translations is emphasized in Paul William Roberts article My Translation Problem. See Paul W. Roberts My Translation Problem:
One Man's ProtestAgainst the Desecration of Dead Languages, Lingua Franca, Dec.
1996, at 69-75. Roberts notes:
When we reach the realms of ancient tongues like Vedic or Sumerian, there
are entire subfields dominated... by the work of one single scholar ....
[T]hese particular scholarly circumstances are significant for the mortals who
must, whether for pleasure or some interdisciplinary project, encounter an
ancient tongue in translation. With no one to have a worrying tendency to
make translations that look painstakingly liberal but are in reality arbitrary,
illiterate, or bizarre-not to mention unverifiable.
Id at 70. It is, of course, precisely the question of "verifiability" that plagues anyone
interested in the issue of translation.
29. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
30. Id. § 9, cl. 4. I am indebted to Calvin Johnson for my own realization of the
problems generated by this clause. He has treated this subject in a fascinating, as yet
unpublished, essay, "Handling the Botch in the Center of the Constitution: Apportionment of Direct Taxes."
31. Id. § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1.
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gested in the discussion following the initial presentation of these
remarks, "translation" is offered simply as a synonym of "interpretation" or "understanding,"'32 then this means, I believe, that the translation analogy in fact give us no added insight into the complexities of
interpretation. By definition, synonyms can be used in place of one
another, so that anyone using the term "translation" could presumably replace it with "interpretation" without any loss of semantic content. But Lessig claims, I believe, to be offering us a way of adding to
our understanding of what "understanding" or "interpretation" is like,
phenomenologically. Ultimately, we must ask ourselves if the translation analogy saves us from any of the specific disputes that have dominated constitutional theory in (at least) the past quarter century. I am
dubious. There is a tremendous amount to be learned from Lessig's
particular treatment of our constitutional past. His remarks about the
"Erie effect," for example are richly provocative. But learning from
Lessig does not, I believe, require that one necessarily embrace the
translation analogy.
I am hesitant to conclude on this negative note, in part because I
happily confess to sharing Lessig's interest in the notion of translation
and the practical implications of being familiar with a text only
through a translation. Indeed, about fifteen years ago I became sufficiently intrigued by the problem of translation to commission a University of Texas student, who had been a professional translator prior
to coming to Austin, to find a French translation of the United States
Constitution 33 and translate it back into English without, of course,
any reference to the original English text.
Imagine, for example, that all original English-language versions of
the Constitution had for some unaccountable reason been destroyed
and that some researcher of the future was entirely dependent on a
French translation for his or her understanding of the United States
Constitution.3 What might one's picture of the Constitution then be?
As the beginning of an answer, I offer some of the translations given
me by this student-translator (who I recently discovered, now lives in
Paris, so I assume this is added evidence that he was no slouch as a
student of the French language).
Article I, Section VIII, Clause 1, 35 for example, he translated as
"Congress shall have the power to assess and levy fees, duties, taxes
and excise taxes, to pay the debt of the United States, to provide for
32. Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Fordham University School of

Law 221-22 (Sept. 20, 1996), (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
33. The text translated is that found in Maurice Duverger, Constitutions et Documents Politiques 246 (1957).
34. I assume that our knowledge especially of some ancient texts is based entirely
on just such translations. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 69-75.
35. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States .... "
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their common defense, and to attend to their general prosperity."
You will instantly notice, no doubt, that there is nothing about the
"general welfare" in this version of the clause. And I do know enough
of French to be able to read basic cognates, so I checked for myself
that the Duverger translation does indeed refer to "prosperite generale,"36 and not to whatever the French word for "welfare" might be.
If that's how Article I, Section 8 begins, how does it end? The answer is that Congress is authorized, in Clause 18, "[t]o make all laws
which may be required by the execution of the powers listed above
and all those which the present Constitution vests in either the Government of the United States, or all the departments or officials thereunder."37 One will obviously search in vain for the term "necessary
and proper." A final example: one part of the First Amendment now
reads that "Congress may not make any law concerning the establishment of a religion ... .,"38 To put it mildly, the placement of the "a"
before "religion" has profound implications for one's theory of establishment, at least if one is a hard-core textualist. Is that indeed what
the French believe that our Constitution says? As Casey Stengal
might have put it, you can look it up, and you would find that the
French text
indeed includes the phrase "l'etablissement d'une
39
religion. ,,
Now, of course, what makes this example slightly amusing (though,
I hope, edifying as well) is precisely that we are in fact all native
speakers and thus aware of the potentially misleading aspects of the
French translation. But, as already suggested, if by some unaccountable accident we had lost all evidence (and memory) of the original text
of the Constitution and had to depend on the French translation, then
we would presumably be without the resources to criticize it as "unfaithful" in important senses to the original. To be able to criticize any
of these as inadequate translations requires access to the original text
plus fluency in both its language and that to which it is being translated. What this means, as a practical matter, is that the only person
truly capable of offering an authoritative assessment of any given
translation would in fact not require any such translation herself. But
if we do need a translation, because the language of the original is
truly alien to us, then we are, in a fundamental sense, incompetent to
offer any authoritative critique of the translation that is handed us.

36. "general prosperity."
37. "[The Congress shall have power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
38. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ......
39. "the establishment of a religion."

